Balancing Isolation and Sharing of Data for Third-Party Extensible App
  Ecosystems by Schröder, Florian et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
41
2.
76
41
v2
  [
cs
.C
R]
  1
0 A
pr
 20
15
Balancing Isolation and Sharing of Data
in Third-Party Extensible App Ecosystems
Florian Schro¨der1, Raphael M. Reischuk2, and Johannes Gehrke3
1 Saarland University, Germany
2 ETH Zurich, Switzerland
3 Cornell University, USA
Abstract. In the landscape of application ecosystems, today’s cloud users
wish to personalize not only their browsers with various extensions or their
smartphones with various applications, but also the various extensions and
applications themselves. The resulting personalization significantly raises the
attractiveness for typical Web 2.0 users, but gives rise to various security risks
and privacy concerns, such as unforeseen access to certain critical components,
undesired information flow of personal information to untrusted applications,
or emerging attack surfaces that were not possible before a personalization has
taken place.
In this paper, we propose a novel extensibility mechanism to implement per-
sonalization of existing cloud applications towards (possibly untrusted) com-
ponents in a secure and privacy-friendly manner. Our model provides a clean
component abstraction, thereby in particular ruling out undesired component
accesses and ensuring that no undesired information flow takes place between
application components — either trusted from the base application or un-
trusted from various extensions. We then instantiate our model in the SAFE
web application framework (WWW 2012), resulting in a novel methodology
that is inspired by traditional access control and specifically designed for the
newly emerging needs of extensibility in application ecosystems. We illustrate
the convenient usage of our techniques by showing how to securely extend an
existing social network application.
1 Introduction
In times of massive and still increasing use of web resources, platform-independent
Rich Internet Applications (RIAs) are considered of high importance. Called Software
as a Service (SaaS), these kinds of applications are often database-driven and predom-
inantly make high demands on their underlying technology. Today’s Web 2.0 users
wish to personalize their devices and applications – from minorly invasive customiza-
tions (such as changing the visual appearance) to functionality-extending changes that
constitute true forms of extensibility. Not only smartphones, tablets, and browsers are
in focus of personalization, but also existing RIAs should be customizable – and even
extensible – in previously unforeseen directions [3,31,12,34,15,18,22,17].
Such user-driven personalizations (sometimes interchangeably referred to as cus-
tomizations) inhabit extensible app ecosystems for web components and influence the
content, the style, and the functionality of interactive web systems: the welcome page
of Amazon.com shows different items for Alice as compared to Bob (content), an aged
user might wish to have a larger font size for displaying text on his tablet or desktop
computer (style), while a teenage user might long for advanced features to publish
media data from any smartphone application to Facebook without waiting for her
OS provider to support the desired features (functionality). Customization of content
and style was traditionally referred to as personalization in the literature [14,35,17].
However, with the advent of Web 2.0, extensibility of functionality has become a novel
and the most challenging component in the area of personalization.
One of the central difficulties of realizing extensibility is to faithfully address the
various security and privacy aspects that naturally arise when functionality is ex-
tended in a user-driven manner. While customization of content and style usually
imposes no security vulnerabilities, extensibility of functionality (i.e., the incorpora-
tion of new program components into an existing environment) faces – apart from the
following functional issues – also a number of security-related challenges.
(1) Functional contracts between the existing and the new components have to be
met. Consider for example an address book component CA that exposes phone num-
bers to communication components (e.g., Skype). A specified personalization could
require the address book component CA to interact with a particular communication
component CC that might be introduced to the systems by virtue of extensibility.
Functional contracts ensure that the data exchange format of both interfaces of CA
and CC match, i.e., CC needs to determine not only which global data exists in the
environment of the address book, but also in which format the data is accessible.
Moreover, CC should have the option to integrate its own data structures into the
app ecosystem.
(2) Security guarantees have to be ensured for the entire composed system: (a) In-
formation flow / privacy: users want to have credible guarantees that their personal
data is properly protected, they should not be divulged to potentially untrusted appli-
cations or untrusted extensions of existing applications that were previously consid-
ered trustworthy. The access control policies for the data of the existing address book
component CA should correctly and securely be specified when accessed by the addi-
tionally integrated communication component CC . Other components should securely
access data that has been imported by CC due to the extensibility. (b) Integrity: users
wish to rely on the integrity of information they get provided, i.e., no malicious user
should be able to interfere in the communication in a way that alters the result in an
unforeseen or potentially harmful manner. (c) New attack vectors: the goal is to aug-
ment extensibility with general security mechanisms that prevent situations in which
the extensibility opens new attack surfaces. Security is even harder to achieve when
new components are integrated from untrusted and thus potentially malicious sources.
Although software bugs might lead to security holes in a larger composed system, the
chances for an attacker to introduce malicious components are much higher in open
and extensible environments.
Existing customization frameworks, such as [13,15,34,19,18,8,6,33,10,9], are not
suited for our purposes: first, they do not target security, but solely concentrate on
providing proper functionality; second, they strive for customization rather than for
true extensibility. We need abstractions for app ecosystems in which the users can
create, share, and install third-party apps through an “app store”, thereby creating
new applications with enforced security properties.
Contributions. In a nutshell, this paper provides a novel mechanism for secure
extensibility in the field of secure web application development. More precisely, this
paper makes the following contributions.
(C1) Isolation/Separation. In order to address the aforementioned security chal-
lenges, we propose a novel abstraction for controlling access to principal data with
a clear separation for multiple principal dimensions. Our model is inspired by tradi-
tional access control models; however, given the nature of Web 2.0 with extensibility
demands, our model additionally captures the features of multi-dimensional granu-
larity to support arbitrary context-aware personalizations and functional extensions.
We provide an instantiation of our model that establishes enforced data separation
in two dimensions: for users and components of an extensible app ecosystem. This
two-dimensional instantiation provides automatic annotation of data items to pave the
way towards flexible runtime delegation of privileges and accountability management.
(C2) Sharing/Wiring. Furthermore, in order to share data across component/user
boundaries, we propose a wiring methodology to establish explicit data flows between
separated app ecosystem components with explicit control over the actual data flow.
To this end, we have revised the hierarchical activation model of a recently proposed
web application framework [31] by a more sophisticated explicit information flow
model for app ecosystems. Although the activation model nicely corresponds to the
hierarchical structure of HTML web pages, personalization in terms of true extensibil-
ity requires to move on to a model that allows for data flows beyond the information
propagation along the edges of the hierarchical data structures proposed in [31].
(C3) Implementation. We have implemented our new extensibility mechanisms
in [31], which is a suitable choice for our methodologies since the framework originally
laid the foundation for subsequent extensions towards secure extensibility. However,
the existing extensibility mechanisms had some architectural drawbacks, e.g., all ap-
plication data was globally managed by a centralized and trusted entity that enforces
access control policies over the data. This notion of global data, however, does not
fully capture the flavor of our extensibility model and is hard to handle from a secu-
rity perspective. The deficiencies have been addressed to provide more flexibility and
enforcement mechanisms to incorporate the security properties of our model.
(C4) Showcase. Finally, in order to illustrate the convenient usage of our tech-
niques, we demonstrate how to securely extend an existing social network web appli-
cation by an incremental search functionality that nicely integrates into the previously
existing environment.
Outline. Section 2 provides background information on traditional access control
mechanisms, and recaps the basics of the underlying framework. Section 3 introduces
the abstraction model for our new mechanisms (C1,C2). Section 4 presents an imple-
mentation of our mechanisms (C3). Section 5 shows the efficacy of our extensibility
approach (C4). Section 6 mentions additional related work and Section 7 concludes.
2 Background
This section provides background information about traditional access control mech-
anisms and recaps the basics of the SAFE activation framework [31].
2.1 Access Control Mechanisms
Traditional access control mechanisms consider the user who requests an operation
to decide whether to accept or to reject the operation on a given dataset. A trusted
entity keeps track of ownerships on the datasets that allow for enforcing appropriate
boundaries. For example, a trusted entity can be the filesystem on a multi-user desktop
computer, which prevents unintended cross-user file access. Figure 1a shows a scenario
in which Alice cannot access Bob’s home directory, and vice versa.
Likewise, boundaries across applications are enforced through sandboxes that pre-
vent a particular application from accessing data in the scope of another application
in a common environment. As example, a common multi-application scenario that is
suited for deploying such a sandbox is the encapsulation of application-specific data
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Fig. 1. Data separation (a) on a multi-user system, (b) on a multi-application system, and
(c) in combination.
on contemporary smartphones [1]: In Figure 1b, the camera software of a smartphone
(component C1) shall not access data stored by the address book (component C2).
Both concepts have to be combined to achieve extensible and data-driven access
control mechanisms for the recent trends in cloud applications [37], in which multiple
users interact with so-called mashup applications [13] composed of multiple disjoint
software components: It is insufficient to solely implement per-user access control;
data access has to be additionally restricted to particular software components. Since
third-party software must generally be considered untrusted, both boundaries have
to be enforced centrally and simultaneously — we cannot assume any component to
properly and consistently implement user-based access control for itself. Figure 1c
depicts the separation of data into two realms, namely per-user and per-component.
Consequently, the central access control mechanism for any data entity e has to con-
sider at least the tuple (uid , cid), which can be regarded as the fixation of two different
access control dimensions.
Beyond access control on the basis of two distinct dimensions, one needs to con-
sider extensibility, modularity, and personalization, which are crucial properties of
modern RIAs. Usually, these properties imply the possibility of users who may want
to share their own data and particular applications that may have to jointly operate
on the same datasets, e.g., imagine Alice wants to share her music files with Bob;
likewise, GPS data may be used in both the camera software component and the ad-
dress book component. The resulting need for well-defined interaction amongst users
and/or software components suggests the possibility of weakening the data separa-
tion requirements in either one dimension, thereby increasing the degrees of freedom
beyond a fixed user or component.
Existing access control approaches are usually single-dimensional. By canonically
embedding multiple dimensions to a single dimension, e.g., by trivial enumeration
of all tuple permutations, one might lose efficiency and thereby also granularity (see
below). A proper reconciliation of more than one dimension is required to provide a
clean methodology for the design of future access control policies for app ecosystems.
Moreover, existing approaches with advanced access control capabilities are not
well-suited for modern web application engineering: Due to the increased expressivity,
approaches such as JIF [24] or strongly typed languages [36,11,16] usually require
explicit annotation, which turns out to be cumbersome and are thus barely used in
heterogeneous environments formed by independent developers. It is hence necessary
to automatically enforce centrally defined access control policies rather than relying
on user-annotated code.
2.2 The SAFE Activation Framework
The SAFE activation framework [31,30] is a web application framework with unified
handling of common techniques largely used by today’s RIAs (HTML, CSS, SQL, and
JavaScript). SAFE is designed for a modularized structuring of web applications into
features, facilitating extensibility by third-party customizations. The modularization
is achieved by dividing a web application into semantically coherent features that are
provided by functional self-contained pieces of code, the so-called f-units.
For performance reasons, a web application modeled in SAFE maintains a persis-
tent database connection with essentially non-restricted permissions. The application
itself (or its developer team) is hence responsible for maintaining well-suited privi-
leges of its users and for enforcing appropriate security policies such as access control,
information flow, privacy, anonymity, and more.
However, due to SAFE’s open environment with possibly untrusted f-units, at least
the access control policies across f-units should be enforced by a central and trusted
entity in order to prevent arbitrary data access of potentially malicious f-units. The
trusted entity should provide a generic and secure interface for defining access policies
that reflect the database semantics as intended by the developers: each f-unit must be
able to rely on the enforcement of the access control policies that are stated along with
the corresponding f-unit’s database tables. Such policies should be flexible enough to
support the ability of extending an application in unforeseen directions.
3 Formal App Ecosystem Model
This section details a new extensibility concept, presents a formal model thereof, and
provides an instantiation of the model for the needs of extensible app ecosystems.
Notation. A common term in the context of access control is the notion of principals.
Principals are usually constraint to users within a system. Throughout this paper,
however, by a principal we denote any first-class object for which an access control
policy may be applied (e.g., an authenticated user, an installed software component
on a smartphone, or a specific physical location around a company’s headquarters). A
principal may possess and manage its data. A principal class is a set of principals with
structurally similar properties (e.g., users, software components, devices, locations).
We sometimes refer to the various principal classes as principal dimensions. By ℘(X)
we denote the power set of a set X .
3.1 A Novel Security Extensibility Concept
The major challenge in defining a suitable principal model for extensible app ecosys-
tems is to develop an abstraction that satisfies at least the following requirements.
(1) The abstraction must take into account the simultaneous interplay of mul-
tiple dimensions (a user U runs a software component C on a device D at some
physical location L, etc.). Note that such an interplay was not important before the
advent of app ecosystems, e.g., traditional browser security with extensible plug-ins
dealt with only a single user who operates with multi-component web applications.
The security mechanism of an extensible web application, however, has to take into
account various dimensions such as multiple components and multiple users. (2) The
abstraction must focus on efficient reasoning for all fields in the cross product of
multiple dimensions. App ecosystems naturally constitute multi-dimensional princi-
pal grids in which every principal class exists in combination with any other principal
class. An ubiquitous access control policy must comprise each cell in the grid. For each
item of the cross product ranging over all dimensions, a meaningful and efficient policy
must exist. The policy should be concise and transparent since an embedding of each
dimension to single-dimensional traditional access control policies would not only be
cumbersome to maintain, but might also introduce security flaws due to the increased
complexity of the embedding. (3) Extensibility requires the integration of contextual
information in the process of deciding access control. Dependencies between compo-
nents and users require context-aware reasoning methods in which the context is
expressed in terms of a dimension, or by the presence of information provided by a
principal. For example, owning a certificate might allow a user to access certain data
of a component. Such certificates can be introduced through extensibility mechanisms
and thereby make the access control mechanisms highly dynamic. Privileges should
not be restricted to (static) binary decisions (privilege to read data: yes/no), but
instead should take into account an extensible environment with information from
multiple dimensions to allow for more fine-grained and conditioned policies.
Some of the aforementioned requirements resemble traditional access control ab-
stractions; others have to be tailored to the specific needs of extensible web develop-
ment. Traditional abstractions for access control (user-based, role-based, etc.) were
tailored to different purposes and are thus constraint to single dimensions (users, roles,
etc.). In the single dimension, only users are considered first-class citizens; software
components are no first-class objects. Consider, for instance, a UNIX file system in
which Alice’s home directory has the permissions rwx (i.e., read, write, and execute)
for the owner Alice (cf. Figure 1a). There is no way of specifying that a particular
software component — in this case some executable UNIX file — may access Alice’s
home directory, while another component may not. The reason is that components
are running on behalf of users and thus have the same user privileges. However, com-
ponents should be treated independently from users, so that individual access control
can be specified in order to deny access to possibly malicious components (malware,
worms, and viruses). Moreover, in traditional role-based access control settings, every
component would maintain a list of roles whose users are allowed to access the com-
ponent’s data. In the file system example, every file or directory belongs to a group of
users. Adding a user to a system requires to carefully check the user’s memberships in
the groups of users. Adding a user to a non-transparent group might grant unintended
privileges to the user.
These considerations culminate in a novel abstraction that is particularly tailored
to the emerging paradigm shift in modern web applications. The abstraction allows for
efficient reasoning and maintaining the partially conflicting requirements. The strong
forms of extensibility, and in particular the inter-functionality operation with their
mutual conditions and environmental dependencies, require novel methods that can
be efficiently deployed and maintained. More precisely, in our model, every data item
may have an individual access control policy for every principal in every dimension.
All principals are thus first-class citizens that inhabit the environment of an extensible
web application. In particular, any principal class can be extended at any point in
time by new principals, e.g., users can be created, software components can be added,
new hardware devices can be set up, and new physical locations can be explored.
Context-awareness is modeled as part of the extensibility: the integration of a new
component into a system allows for data integration and the establishment of links
to existing components. This process is referred to as wiring. A wiring does not only
make data flows between components explicit, but also introduces credentials to state
properties about the actual environment. A credential stated by component C1 might
for instance certify that Alice and Bob are friends, and hence Bob might read Alice’s
contact list which is maintained by a different component C2. Moreover, our model
provides unique ownerships in all dimensions which can efficiently be inferred by the
currently operating component by the unique position in the principal grid. As a
side product, we believe that this might help in establishing accountability properties
whenever necessary. Furthermore, our abstraction contains the concept of sharing
which is based on wirings and ownerships. The goal of sharing is to provide a reliable
mechanism for enabling explicit information flow across the boundaries of principals.
3.2 Multi-Dimensional Principal Model
We consider the n-dimensional universe Pn of principal classes Pn := 〈P1, . . . ,Pn〉
that subsumes all instances of the particular class Pi, e.g., users, components, loca-
tions, and so on. Furthermore, we define the data storage as the set of all data items
D. Each such item is required to have a unique owner principal in each dimension,
which would be affected by an operation on the particular data item. More precisely,
for each data item d ∈ D, we define affPi : D → Pi to represent the affected principal
in dimension i. The affected principals may be determined with arbitrary semantics,
according to the operation type, information flow, inference prevention, etc. We in-
tentionally stay as general as possible here in order to permit a wide range of possible
subsequent instantiations. For instance, items in WHERE clauses of SQL queries can be
captured, or timing information in the analysis of side-channels.
In order to access data items, a principal can issue a request r ∈ R. We define
scopeD : R → ℘(D) to determine the scope of data items for such a request, i.e., the
set of affected data items per request.
As motivated in Section 2, we want to enable sharing between principals of the
same dimension, e.g., user Alice wants to share her favorite music files with user Bob.
We thus require a function shPi : Pi×Pi×D → {0, 1} for each dimension Pi to decide
whether sharing from one principal to another is defined for a specific data item.
Finally, the main access control policy req valid : R×P1×. . .×Pn → {0, 1} decides
whether a given request is valid for all principals associated with this request (the
issuers). More specifically, a request r is considered permissive if for each affected
principal pi, we have that either pi itself is the issuer of r, or that pi has explicitly
shared the requested data with the actual issuer. Formally, req valid(r , p1 , . . . , pn) iff
∀d ∈ scopeD(r) :
n∧
i=1
affPi (d) = pi ∨ shPi (affPi (d), pi , d).
Example. Consider a set of users U and a set of software components C in a web
application as an instantiation of two different principal classes, such that P2 = 〈U , C〉.
If component c ∈ C issues a request r ∈ R on behalf of user u ∈ U , then r is
considered permissive if one of the following conditions holds for all affected data
items d ∈ scopeD(r):
No sharing: affU (d) = u and affC(d) = c, i.e., the request only accesses data that is
in the scope of both u and c.
Cross-C sharing: affU (d) = u, affC(d) = c
′ for some c′ 6= c, and the component c′
has shared the requested data with component c, i.e., shC(c
′, c, d).
Cross-U sharing: affU (d) = u
′ for some u′ 6= u, affC(d) = c, and the user u
′ has
shared the requested data with user u, i.e., shU (u
′, u, d).
Cross-U ,C sharing: affU (d) = u
′ for some u′ 6= u, affC(d) = c
′ for some c′ 6= c,
and user u′ as well as component c′ have both shared the requested data with c
running on behalf of u, i.e., shU(u
′, u, d) and shC(c
′, c, d).
3.3 Instantiation for App Ecosystems
We show how to instantiate the generic model into a concrete existing model. This
instantiation constitutes a general role model for extensible app ecosystems. We will
later refine this model to work within the SAFE framework. We concentrate on two
dimensions and hence create two principal classes: authenticated users and software
components. Finally, we show how to incorporate common relational database models
within our instantiated model. Furthermore, we show a wiring methodology to imple-
ment sharing between components by establishing links between the database tables
owned by the particular components.
Let us reconsider the previous example of a multi-user web application with exten-
sible components, which instantiates P2 = 〈U , C〉 as principal universe to constitute
the set of users U and software components C.
Tables and Affected Components. We assume the data storage D is reflected
by a standard relational database model. By regarding all data items of D on the
granularity of database rows, data items can be grouped in a set of database tables T
expressed as a relation data : T → ℘(D). Database tables are divided into three types
(local, input, output) according to their purpose. First to mention, local tables lt : C →
℘(T ) hold all data items owned by a software component, e.g., all pictures managed
by a photo camera app cam are stored in its local tables lt(cam). Additionally, there
is a notion of input tables it : C × U → ℘(T ) that subsume data items which are
explicitly provided by other components by means of sharing. For example, the camera
app might expect to find GPS data from the GPS app in an input table gps ∈
it(cam , ·). Access control policies might impose restrictions on sharing the actual
GPS data according to the user who is accessing the data. Input tables are therefore
instantiated with respect to a particular user. For example, the camera application
running under user Alice can only access GPS data for Alice through the input table
gps ∈ it(cam , alice).
Requests. Database tables (whether local or input) establish a relation between
requests R and concrete data items D stored in the respective tables. We define the
tables affected by a request as its scope: scopeT : R → ℘(T ). The datasets of tables in
the scope include the actually affected datasets. We hence lift scopeT to data items:
we say d ∈ scopeD(r) if and only if ∃ t ∈ scopeT (r) such that d ∈ data(t).
We assume that every data item can be accessed by a local table or by an input
table: ∀d ∈ D ∃c ∈ C : (∃t ∈ lt(c) : d ∈ data(t)) ∨ (∃u ∈ U , ∃t ∈ it(c, u) : d ∈ data(t)).
To allow for greatest flexibility, the content of an input table t ∈ it(·, ·) may be
provided by multiple different software components at the same time (the details
are presented below). The component providing a particular data item d ∈ data(t),
i.e., its source src : D → C, serves as the affected component for access on that in-
put table: ∀t ∈ it(·, ·), d ∈ data(t) : affC(d) := src(d). For access on local tables,
the affected component is the associated component c ∈ C itself: ∀t ∈ lt(c), d ∈
data(t) : affC(d) := c.
Owners and Affected Users. Similar to defining the owner of a data item in terms
of software components C, we next define the owner of a data item in terms of users U .
In order to determine the affected user of any access on a data item d ∈ D, we require
the presence of an owner mapping own : D → U . Such mapping is expected to be
automatically stored with the data item. The retrieval of the owner information could,
for example, rely on a unique identifier or a particular owner column for each data
item. By assuming a proper owner information management for both local tables and
input tables, we instantiate the affected user accordingly: ∀d ∈ D : affU (d) := own(d).
Sharing. The goal of sharing is to provide a reliable mechanism for enabling explicit
information flow across the boundaries of principals, thereby enforcing various dy-
namic confidentiality policies. In an extensible app ecosystem, we assume that every
persistently stored data item might be processed arbitrarily by a component before
eventually being stored in a particular local table. As components “see” any dataset
upon insertion, every information represented in a local table might be reconstructible
by the corresponding component. It is thus irrelevant with respect to confidentiality,
whether we explicitly allow components to directly access arbitrary data items of an
associated local table or not. Moreover, access control directly on top of local tables
could be achieved by parameterized views that exclusively provide user-dependent re-
stricted access to the underlying tables. This so-called Truman model [32] suffers from
various drawbacks. For instance, transparent views that hide particular data items
may introduce subtle inconsistencies for aggregate functions such as AVG or COUNT.
Due to the limited gain and the anticipated problems of a restriction directly on
local tables, we allow a component c to have full access to its local tables for all users.
We hence assume for all local tables t∈ lt(c),
∀d∈data(t), u∈U \own(d) : shU (own(d), u, d) (1)
Making local tables public in their component’s scope does not introduce potential
information leakages since components do not gain any additional knowledge. In ad-
dition, the potential leakage or abuse of information has to be considered anyhow by
the user before providing sensitive data to a particular component.
Similarly, a user has to rely on the access control mechanisms of the providing com-
ponent in which datasets might be included in an input table. Thus, given component
c ∈ C and user u ∈ U , we assume for all input tables t∈ it(c, u),
∀d∈data(t), u∈U \own(d) : shU (own(d), u, d) (2)
By the definition of an input table t, all data items d ∈ data(t) are intentionally
shared on behalf of the providing component src(d). Hence, for all input tables of
component c ∈ C running in the scope of user u ∈ U , we assume ∀t ∈ it(c, u), d ∈
data(t) : shC(src(d), c, d)
By Equations (1) and (2), we basically incapacitate the user by shifting the sharing
responsibility solely to the component dimension — in contrast to the requirement
that both dimensions have to agree on a sharing of a particular data item. However, a
component can only share datasets that it was explicitly provided with by either the
dataset’s owner or by another sharing component. We can regard both cases as the
implicit affirmation of the user based on his personal trust assessment for potential
sharing in a manner the component may specify on own behalf.
Overall Sandbox. Using the previously introduced predicates, we propose an in-
stantiation of the formal model that we call sandbox. The sandbox sb discrimi-
nates a particular request according to common operations in relational database
systems: op : R → {SEL, INS, UPD, DEL}.4 We define the semantics of the sandbox
sb : R× U × C → {0, 1} as follows: sb(r , u, c) 7→
if op(r)∈{INS, UPD, DEL}: ∀t∈scopeT (r) : t∈ lt(c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(3A)
∧∀d∈scopeD(r) : own(d)=u︸ ︷︷ ︸
(3B)
else if op(r)∈{SEL}: ∀t ∈ scopeT (r) : t ∈ lt(c) ∨ t ∈ it(c, u)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(3C)
(3)
4 Here, op is defined to restrict a single request to a single operation. We stress that this is
not necessarily the case in practice, e.g., an update operation UPD might contain a select
operation SEL. However, we assume op(r) to be well-defined for all r ∈ R — if necessary,
r has to be split up into sub-requests.
Intuitively, a modification request {INS,UPD,DEL} is considered permissive if it op-
erates only on own local tables (3A) and if all affected datasets are owned by the
authenticated user (3B). A select request {SEL} is considered permissive, if it oper-
ates only on own local tables or on input tables (3C).
Soundness. In order to show that the presented sandbox semantics is a valid instanti-
ation of the previously introduced formal model, i.e., the sandbox indeed reflects that
for every dimension, either own or explicitly shared datasets are affected, we have
to prove the soundness of our instantiation with respect to the formal model. More
precisely, it has to be shown that sb(r , u, c) ⇒ req valid(r , u, c), i.e., that the sand-
box is at least as restrictive as the model. The implications of the sandbox semantics
immediately entail this statement without further proof obligations.
3.4 Component Wiring Model
One of the major features and challenges of today’s data-driven and reactive web
applications is to ensure server-client consistency. If a component modifies the state
of the database, the changes should be reflected by all its dependent components
(and their visual presentation) and also by the client instances of the components.
In SAFE, any component (referred to as f-unit) can activate other components by
means of an activation act : C → ℘(C). Upon an activation initiated by a component c,
activation data is passed from c through the particular activation interfaces of act(c).
The behavior of the activated child component instances thus depends on the state of
the parent component c. Consequently, the set act(c) is possibly data-dependent of c.
F-units generate HTML content that is enclosed by a particular node in the DOM
tree of the HTML page. F-units and their activations hence constitute a hierarchical,
cycle-free structure, the activation tree: Gact = 〈Vact ,Eact〉 = 〈C, {(c, c
′) ∈ C × C |
c′ ∈ act(c)}〉. Due to the activation data dependencies, each change in a component’s
data realm possibly outdates some components in the corresponding subtrees of Gact .
The concept of sharing introduces an additional possibility of receiving data such
that propagation of changes is not necessarily fully reflected by the edges of the
activation tree. This additional data dependency, as imposed by our sharing mech-
anism, is covered by the combined graph Gcomb = 〈Vact ,Eact ∪ Esh 〉 that includes
edges representing the presence of an input table from one component to another:
Esh = {(c, c
′) | ∃u ∈ U , t ∈ it(c′, u), d ∈ data(t) : c = src(d)}
The definitions of both Eact and Esh can be considered an over-approximation
since they do not respect the extent of the actually changed data — their combination,
however, clearly captures all possible dependencies.
Using the combined graph, we can determine (and then update) components that
rely on stale data. If a local table of a particular component c changes due to a
modifying query, the transitive closure starting at c contains all potentially stale
components that should be considered for updating. For the combined graph, we
determine a topological component ordering, which takes the partial orderings as
defined by the particular dependencies into account. The global topological ordering
is well-defined, as wirings and activations that would result in a cycle are rejected
in the first place, and thereby ensures that the rebuilding step propagates on yet
refreshed data. Using the partial ordering, the order of required activations (and thus
the components to be rebuilt) can be fully determined — in other words, all outdated
components are rebuilt in an order such that all data requirements are satisfied. The
freshly generated content is merged into complete subtrees of the activation tree, and
thus also into the DOM tree. Finally, the rebuilt content is pushed to stale client
browser instances.
CREATE TRIGGER tbl_upd_t BEFORE UPDATE ON tbl
FOR EACH ROW CALL assert(
NEW.owner <=>OLD.owner AND NEW.owner <=>@uid AND verify_uid(’funit ’,’sk ’)
);
Figure 2. MySQL trigger that will be executed before any UPDATE operation on the partic-
ular table. Modifications of the owner column are prevented.
4 Implementation
This section presents the implementation of the major parts of our model instantiation
in the SAFE framework. More specifically, the semantics of the sandbox formalisms
(Equation 3 and its components 3A, 3B, 3C) rely on the following insights as intro-
duced below:
(3A) Permissions for INS, UPD, and DEL operations are only granted on local tables.
In addition, the query sandbox (explained below) ensures that a component can
only access its own local tables.
(3B) According to the owner invariant (explained below), before each modifying
operation, MySQL triggers verify an owner column of the particular row according
to the authenticated user.
(3C) Permissions for SEL: as for (3A), the query sandbox ensures that only own tables
(whether local or input table) are accessible via SELECT queries.
For automatic database management, a SAFE f-unit may provide an SQL-style .db-
file which declares its tables (local, input, output). In the following, we present chosen
aspects of the parsing, validation, and interpretation of .db-files during the f-unit in-
tegration process. We assume the deployment of the widely used open source database
MySQL version 5.1. Furthermore, due to space constraints, we omit technical details
whenever possible. Examples are shown in Section 5.
Owner Invariant. We consider a data modification attempt as authorized only if
the operation either adds a new dataset with valid user information or modifies (or
deletes) a dataset that was created on behalf of the same user before. This achieves
separation in the user dimension (as required by the formal model) as well as the
own(·) validation (as required by part (3B) in our instantiation). As this approach
requires keeping track of the creating user and the extent of each dataset, we require
each dataset – more technically, each row of a table – to hold an owner column.
In order to ensure accountability, owner-preserving integrity invariants are defined
as transition constraints for each modification operation on the basis of owner column
values: The owner column of the dataset to be inserted, updated, or deleted must
match the authenticated user the f-unit is currently connected to. In addition, the
owner column must not change due to an update operation.
For implementing these requirements, MySQL’s trigger concept [25] is a suitable
choice. Before each particular operation, a trigger inspects a column’s pending new
and old value (where appropriate) by the NEW or OLD pseudo-table, respectively. In
addition, direct access to a column value avoids the need for parsing the query string
and thus reduces the risk for the check of being bypassed. Figure 2 shows an UPDATE
trigger that ensures both requirements of our stated invariant by raising an error if
the value of the owner column has either changed or cannot be validated against
the connected user. The purpose and semantics of the function verify uid(), its
arguments, and the variable @uid are derived in the following. The operator <=> is
MySQL’s NULL-safe equality operator.
To let a trigger verify the owner invariant, the user u known at SAFE’s centralized
reference monitor (CRM) must be made available to the trigger in a flexible though
authentic way. When relying on the fact that there is a single database connection per
CRM and a single CRM per f-unit processing lifetime, we hence have a single database
connection per f-unit and user. This allows the usage of a connection-specific MySQL
session variable [26] to pass the current user u to the trigger with each query. After
establishing the connection to the database, the CRM thus sets two session variables
@uid := u and @uid h := H(@uid | funit | sk) with the f-unit name funit , a secret
key sk , and a cryptographic hash function H .
Before the query is executed, the verify uid() function in the trigger of Figure 2
is thus able to compare @uid h with the outcome of its own hash computation using
@uid. The included sk inside the hash of @uid h prevents an f-unit from creating
valid hashes for arbitrary users on its own, as the sk is only available to the CRM and
hard-coded in the trigger. Consequently, no f-unit should be granted the TRIGGER or
SUPER privileges [27]. The funit string ensures that even in case the @uid h is leaked,
the disclosure is limited to the scope of the particular f-unit and user.
Each table stated in a .db-file is thus forced to specify exactly one owner col-
umn. This convention allows for the creation of appropriate triggers that verify this
particular column against the @uid variable that was set by the CRM prior in the
connection — and thereby enforce the invariants as specified above.
Query Sandbox. Apart from data separation in the user dimension, the formal
model requires a clear data separation between components — more technically, the
formal model requires an explicit assignment between tables and f-units, and the
prevention of any cross-references. We thus have to ensure that incoming queries only
access tables in the scope of their originating f-unit.
In order to prevent clashes in the table namespace, every stated table in an f-
unit’s .db-file is prefixed with the name of the defining f-unit. For the sake of a
convenient usage and a clear interface, we do not expose the prefixing to the developer.
Instead, the CRM replaces each encountered table in a received query on-the-fly by its
prefixed counterpart. As each f-unit has authenticated itself at the CRM before placing
queries, the f-unit can be determined reliably. Accessed tables are hence enforced to
be permissive according to the particular connected f-unit. In other words, the table
prefixing thus prevents data access across f-unit boundaries and thereby implements
the query sandbox.
In fact, the prefixing approach can be considered as the transformation of a global
(shared) database towards a local (per-f-unit) database. The security of the prefixing
approach solely relies on the robustness of the replacing algorithm.
Wiring. Due to the limitation of f-units to access only their associated tables using
the query sandbox, we considerably lose flexibility: cross-f-unit collaboration via the
database is prevented, a contradiction to the extensibility paradigm of SAFE. We
thus have to provide an implementation of sharing using input tables (cf. Section 3.3).
We need well-defined interfaces for exchanging data across f-unit boundaries, while
preserving all integrity and confidentiality constraints.
In order to receive arbitrary data, f-units declare input tables with a table-like
signature. Output tables implement SELECT statements for providing such datasets,
allowing f-units to decide on their own, which data shall be exposed. Figure 3 shows an
example of an f-unit providing user groups (left-hand side), in which each public group
with its owner is exposed. A statistics f-unit (right-hand side) can receive data items
of various types. As the representation of the data in the providing f-unit does not
necessarily match the intended signature of the input tables of the receiving f-unit, we
should be careful in not limiting the power of an output table when collecting its infor-
mation from other tables. Therefore, arbitrary queries are allowed in the specification
OUTPUT TABLE all_groups = INPUT TABLE stats (
SELECT gid AS key , owner , name key KEY
FROM groups owner OWNER
WHERE public =1 type TINYTEXT )
Figure 3. Example: Defining input and output tables in an f-unit’s .db-file.
of output tables. However, as with all other f-unit queries, output table queries are
automatically table-prefixed and thus restricted to the boundaries of the source f-unit.
Implemented as a VIEW, an output table’s signature (column names and types) can
be determined reliably after creation using MySQL’s information schema.columns
table [28]. Together with the definitions of input tables, we can provide full signatures
of both input and output tables to a new step in the integration process, the wiring.
A wiring matches an input table schema to an output table schema, yielding a
particular mapping that is internally expressed as a SELECT statement. An input table
view can thus be represented by a UNION, which allows to combine multiple mapping
statements — an approach in data integration terms usually referred to as global-as-
view [21]. Each of those input table- and wiring-specific output table queries form a
schema matching that follows syntax and semantics as defined by the input table.
There exist several schema matching techniques that could be used for automatically
deriving input/output table correspondences — these techniques are still prone to
mistakes, suggesting at least a human-aided approach [5]. However, we leave further
improvements of the wiring process between input and output tables, such as an
algorithm-aided schema matching, for future work. Upon integration of an f-unit, the
human integrator is presented the list of all input and output tables and may connect
their particular columns after reviewing types and semantics (cf. Figure 5, left).
Foreign Keys. The goal of input tables is not only to collect data for presentation,
but instead also to extend existing datasets according to the functionality of an f-
unit — by linking own entries to received entries. As an example, consider an f-unit
managing particular objects (images, groups, profiles, . . . ), while a wired child f-unit
provides some per-user functionality on top of each parent object (comments, votes,
. . . ). This 1:1 or 1:N dependency can be expressed as values in a local table that are
explicitly referencing a value in another local table or even in an input table. Upon
deletion of the referenced value, all referencing entries that have become stale are
implicitly deleted in order to ensure consistency between both involved tables, e.g., if
an image has been deleted, all associated comments are deleted as well.
MySQL’s concept of foreign key constraints [29] can be used only for involved
tables that are “real” tables. However, we want to support foreign keys on input tables,
which are implemented as a UNION over the column-mappings to arbitrarily crafted
output tables. We thus implement a custom approach in order to emulate foreign key
semantics with increased flexibility. Using MySQL triggers, our approach keeps track
of dependencies between local tables even through wired input and output tables, and
ensures consistency by detecting and deleting rows that have become invalid. Such
child rows are not necessarily owned by the user who is deleting the parent object.
The operation might hence violate the owner invariant. An explicit handling for such
well-defined cases is implemented as well.
Wiring Invariants. By the presence of a wired input table, we assume that the
wired content was shared intentionally by the providing source f-unit. To provide
stronger security even in case of such intentional disclosure, an input table should be
restrictable to a particular user. As an example, assume an f-unit F that provides
OUTPUT TABLE friends_o (
SELECT CONCAT(uid1 ,uid2) AS key, uid1 AS owner , uid2 AS friend
FROM friends
INVARIANT is(@uid ,owner) OR is(@uid ,friend) )
Figure 4. Invariant examples for output tables, using the relation is(), column references,
and the variable @uid.
the functionality of friendships between users. While friendship information might
be valuable for other components, e.g., for an f-unit that provides some messaging
feature, each particular dataset of the corresponding output table of F shall only be
accessible for either one of the involved users. This intuition reflects that a user who
provides some information to F has to trust F in implementing appropriate access
control, whether in the scope of business logic or output tables.
We thus introduce a deviant output table syntax to incorporate the possibility
of expressing additional invariants for each output table. As shown in Figure 4, the
invariant of friends o uses the session variable @uid, the built-in predicate is(),
and the logical operator OR. The invariant holds true if the @uid matches either the
owner or friend column of the row to be read. In particular, consider the output table
friends o being wired into an input table of a malicious f-unit F ′. Due to the invariant
of friends o, F ′ would gain knowledge of all friends of a particular user u only if u has
used F ′ once. In other words, F ′ has no access granted to u’s datasets until activated
in the scope of u’s @uid. Unless overridden by explicit invariant specification, the
default behavior of output tables assumes the invariant is(@uid,owner) and thereby
protects private data per default.
Dynamic Predicates. As all information an f-unit might refer to is available by
either local tables or by input tables, an f-unit may specify an invariant using tables
as predicates. If the particular f-unit considers friendship information retrieval to be
permissive for friends of either one involved party, the invariant could be stated as
is(@uid ,owner) OR friends (@uid ,owner) OR is(@uid ,friend) OR friends (@uid ,friend)
for friends being a table with binary arity. Likewise, for ignores being an input
table or a local table, an invariant consisting of its negation
!ignores (owner ,@uid) AND !ignores (friend,@uid)
hides datasets for users who are tagged ignored by some of the affected users.
For the verification of invariants, the wiring provides an additional view that selects
from the actual (unrestricted) output table. The restricted view of the output table
includes a WHERE condition that is derived from the whole invariant expression, e.g,
from the predicate tbl(x0, . . . , xi):
EXISTS(SELECT * FROM tbl WHERE p0=x0 AND... AND pi=xi)
The implementation of invariants containing negation or wildcards is analogous.
The existential quantifier semantics with conjunctive matching allows for easy de-
ployment in common environments in which access control is based on group member-
ships, permissions, and/or user relationships. As predicates can even refer to input
tables, the wiring process provides the flexibility and modularity needed for incor-
porating extensions at runtime — knowing the input table’s column semantics is
sufficient for an f-unit to state meaningful invariants.
5 Examples and Evaluation
We illustrate how to conveniently extend an existing application with new functional-
ity, based on the previously introduced techniques. More specifically, we take a SAFE
Fig. 5. Screenshots: Schema matching between Messaging and LiveSearch (left), and the
extended application in which the external LiveSearch f-unit displays results obtained from
customizable sources (right).
application of an interactive social network and add an incremental search function-
ality. The search functionality is modeled as a set of independent f-units.
Initial Application. In addition to various other features, the initial social network
application comprises the common functionality of group membership which is imple-
mented by an f-unit Groups. Any authenticated user may create a group, which can
be joined by other users. As f-units are required to state appropriate output tables for
the sake of extensibility, Groups provides the public output table all groups with a
declaration of data and one invariant:
OUTPUT TABLE all_groups (
SELECT name , gid AS key , owner FROM groups
INVARIANT ALL )
The output table exposes the group names to the wiring process: If wired to all groups,
other f-units can access the names of all available groups. The invariant ALL makes
the group information public, i.e., readable for every user, and thus for every @uid.
Furthermore, an f-unit Messaging implements an instant messaging functionality
and defines an output table private msgs as the set of all messages (local table
conversations) that can be associated with the current user:
OUTPUT TABLE private_msgs (
SELECT msg_id AS key , msg , uid_from AS owner , uid_recipient AS to
FROM conversations
INVARIANT is(owner ,@uid) OR is(to,@uid) )
Per default, every user may access output table rows with a matching owner column
is(owner,@uid), see Section 4. However, the specified invariant replaces this default
behavior by potentially allowing foreign f-units to access both sent and received mes-
sages of the particular user they are currently connected to.
Adding Functionality. Given the initial application, we will now add a common
incremental search functionality. By this means, the f-unit LiveSearch monitors a text
input field for typing events, searches all its available datasets for the input pattern,
and displays matching rows. As introduced in Section 4, we have equipped LiveSearch
with an input table data that can be wired to output tables of other f-units.
INPUT TABLE data ( text TEXT
type VARCHAR (20)
key KEY
owner OWNER )
The input table has two main data fields: text for arbitrary textual content (e.g.,
chat messages, group titles, poll descriptions), and type for an informal description
of the search source type (e.g., messages, groups, polls).
By virtue of this input table, LiveSearch is able to search arbitrary data sets,
even for data sources that are provided by f-units that were not known before, or by
f-units that might come up in the future. At runtime, LiveSearch compares these data
sources with the search patterns entered in LiveSearch’s search input field:
<input type="text" name="search" id=" searchField">
LiveSearch issues queries against its input table data for every keyup-event of the
search field and activates corresponding instances of the f-unit LiveSearchResults :5
<activate :LiveSearchResults
query="SELECT text AS result , type AS info
FROM data
WHERE ’$#search’<>’’ AND
LOWER(text) LIKE LOWER(CONCAT (’%’,REPLACE (’$#search’,’ ’,’%’),’%’))"
refresh =" searchField.keyup" />
Wiring. In the social network setting, the search engine shall include the groups of
the social network in its search results. In order to provide LiveSearch with the actual
group names, the wiring of Groups.all groups into LiveSearch.data maps key 7→
key, name 7→ text, the constant ’Group’ 7→ type, and owner 7→ owner. Furthermore,
upon integration of Messaging, the new feature of searching in both sent and received
messages can be stated by the wiring shown in Figure 5 (left-hand side): key 7→ key,
msg 7→ text, the constant ’Message’ 7→ type, and owner 7→ owner.
Evaluation. The right-hand side of Figure 5 shows the resulting application: a wired
input table allows LiveSearch to display search results generically for datasets of both
Groups andMessaging. The wiring ofGroups.all groups andMessaging.private msgs
into LiveSearch.data results in a safe setting that reflects the modularity and extensi-
bility paradigms, as depicted above. The implementation of LiveSearch benefits from
various features and concepts that are offered by the described extensions of SAFE.
For instance, the result set of LiveSearch can be arbitrarily augmented at “run-time”,
and the wiring allows for easy integration of new functionality into an existing app
ecosystem, without affecting already established apps. Collaboration across f-units
thus only relies on a sufficiently generic interface of all involved f-units, formed by
input and output tables. Furthermore, LiveSearchResults — or any other involved
f-unit — can be replaced by means of extensibility with respect to both presentation
and functionality, allowing for augmenting the application in unforeseen directions.
In addition, even though Messaging publishes privacy-sensitive data, Messaging is
able to bind datasets to appropriate invariants and thus has full control over which
data might possibly be presented to other users. Consequently, the impact of an ex-
tended malicious f-unit (for instance LiveSearch) on the overall system security is
limited to the abuse of the malicious f-unit’s very own or received datasets. Finally,
SAFE’s activation tag <activate..> with the attributes query and refresh allows
for a straight-forward implementation without the need for cumbersome user-defined
AJAX handling — the resulting gain is a high functionality/LoC ratio with all its
implied desirable correctness and security properties.
6 Additional Related Work
Similar to SAFE, the WebRatio development environment [2,7], and, in particular,
theWebML language [9], follow the approach of building web applications by compos-
ing and connecting so-called content units. These units are modeled and structured
by means of an abstract, data-centric description and thus strongly resemble data
5 The activation tag in the code snippet is part of SAFE’s modeling language SFW, an
extended HTML-based declarative programming language that allows for concise incor-
poration of HTML constructs, JavaScript events, and SQL queries.
dependencies as well as the actual data representation layout. Our focus, however,
is to address the possibility of incorporating third-party code, which requires the
presence of appropriate security mechanisms. SMash [20] addresses the task of com-
bining data and code from different origins in standard (i.e., unmodified) browsers
based on HTML iframes. The system establishes secured communication channels
between the different components. However, there is no unified database support for
the different components, and there is no enforced principal model as required in
the case of data-driven applications with sensitive user data, ownership and prove-
nance. Instead of presenting an iframe-based implementation, our model provides a
novel multi-dimensional privilege model suitable for extensible mashup applications.
Moreover, in contrast to [20] and also [23,4], our model does not assume different
origins per each integrated component. Technically, the origin is defined by the triple
scheme/servername/port. Instead, untrusted code is integrated on a single server that
delivers all necessary code at once. As in our model, the ServiceOS operating sys-
tem [37] considers web application components (as well as desktop applications) as
first-class principals. Multi-application sharing is brought to web applications with
cross-principal protection and resource management. The approach is different in that
our approach directly augments the developed applications with functionality and se-
curity, instead of providing an operating system. In particular, applications in our
model run in every standard browser and thus do not require a certain environment
to be installed at the client side.
7 Conclusions
We have proposed a novel extensibility mechanism which is designed for the implemen-
tation of extensibility for existing web applications. Possibly untrusted components
can be integrated in an app ecosystem in a secure and privacy-friendly manner. Our
multi-dimensional principal model provides a clean component abstraction, thereby
impeding undesired component access and ensuring that no undesired information
flow takes place between application components. We have instantiated our model in
the SAFE activation framework, resulting in a novel methodology that is specifically
designed for the newly emerging needs of extensibility in application ecosystems. We
have illustrated the convenient usage of our techniques by showing how to securely
extend an existing social network application.
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